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Part I 
Early History of the Submarine 
A lthough the idea of a submersible boat dates back at least to the early seventeenth century, and a number of efforts to perfect such a vessel had 
occurred over the subsequent years, it was not until the latter part of the 
eighteenth century that realistic attempts began to be made in this respect. 
During the American Revolution David Bushnell devised a one-man 
submersible known as the American Turtle. Its several attacks against British 
warships were, for one reason or another, all unsuccessful.! Then in 1797 Robert 
Fulton, who had been demonstrating his version of the submersible to the French 
Navy, submitted a proposal to the French Directory for the construction and 
the use by his "Nautulus Company" of a submarine against the ships of the 
British Navy. Paragraph Six of that proposal stated? 
And whereas fire Ships or other unusual means of destroying Navies are 
Considered Contrary to the Laws of war, and persons taken in such enterprises 
are liable to Suffer death, it will be an object of Safety if the Directory give the 
Nautulus Company Commissions Specifying that all persons taken in the Nautulus 
or Submarine Expeditio/l Shall be treated as Prisoners of War, And in Case of 
Violence being offered the Government will Retaliate on the British Prisoners in 
a four fold degree. 
It can thus be seen that even in its earliest form, and even when it was to be 
directed solely against warships, the submarine was a controversial weapon. 
Fulton was unable to sell his idea to the French Government. Subsequendy, he 
was equally unsuccessful in selling it to the British.3 
From the very beginning of the idea of a vessel that would travel under the 
water instead of on the water, it was accepted that if it could be successfully 
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developed it would be an asset to small nations, nations which could not afford 
large standing navies. It was assumed that, because ofits anticipated short range, 
it would be used primarily for coastal defense. It is, therefore, not surprising to 
find that during the American Civil War the Confederacy developed and built 
this type of vessel to be used against the blockading warships of the Union Navy.4 
It was called a David and altogether the Confederate Navy probably constructed 
more than a dozen of them. It was not truly a submersible, because, being 
propelled by a steam engine, it had to have a constant source of air. Accordingly, 
it moved with its deck awash and an open hatch-not exacdy a recommended 
method for safe navigation, and one which resulted in a number of sinkings 
during its trials, with the loss of most of the members of the crews. However, 
on October 5, 1863, one of these boats attacked and damaged the U.S.S. New 
Ironsides.5 The Confederates also built a true submersible, called the Hunley, 
propelled by eight members of the crew turning a crankshaft which ran down 
the center for most of the length of the vessel and which was connected to a 
propeller. Its claim to fame is that on February 17, 1864 it sank the U.S.S. 
Housatonic-and itself! It may be said that the David and the Hunley ushered in the 
era of the submarine in warfare--even though at this point the Confederate 
Navy appeared to lose interest in submersibles.6 
In the quarter century which followed, numerous other inventions were 
being developed, and tested, in various countries, particularly in France, a 
country which had early exhibited great interest in such a weapon, even though 
it had rejected Fulton's proposal. The first really successful submersible, the 
forerunner of the submarine of today, was built by John P. Holland, an 
Irish-American who, after he had constructed several models, succeeded in 
selling the latest version of the Holland to the United States Navy in 1900, the 
first that it had acquired? At that same period both the United States Navy and 
the Royal Navy placed orders with Holland for the construction and delivery 
of additional submarines; while a number of continental nations were placing 
similar orders with Holland and other inventors. Even Admiral von Tirpitz, 
head of the German Navy, was eventually convinced that the submarine was 
8 
no longer solely a weapon of coastal defense. 
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference 
When, on December 30, 1898, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofImperial 
Russia issued its proposed agenda for the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, one 
item thereof stated:9 
4. Prohibition of the use in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo-boats or 
of other engines of destruction of the same nature; 
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When the matter was discussed in the Second Subcommission of the First 
Commission of the Conference on May 31, 1899, the German representative 
indicated that "if all the other governments agreed not to adopt vessels of this 
kind, Germany wouldjoin in this understanding"; and the Italian and Japanese 
delegates concurred in that statement; the United States delegate indicated that 
his Government "wishes to preserve full liberty ... to use submarine torpedo 
boats or not"; the delegate of Austria-Hungary gave his personal opinion that 
"this new invention ... may be used for the defense of ports and roadsteads and 
render very important services"; the French delegate stated that "the submarine 
torpedo [boat] has an eminendy defensive purpose, and that the right to use it 
should therefore not be taken from a country"; the British delegate thought that 
"his country would consent to the prohibition in question if all the great Powers 
were agreed on this point. It would concern itselflitde as to what decision the 
smaller countries reached"; the Dutch delegate and the delegate of Sweden and 
Norway believed that "the submarine torpedo Jboat] is a weapon of the weak, 
and does not think its use can be prohibited.,,1 
In his report the Rapporteur of the Subcommission said 11 
After an exchange of personal views on the question of submarine torpedo boats 
which enabled several delegates . . . to formulate very clear and precise ideas 
regarding the future of this weapon, it is shown that, according to the declarations 
made by a majority of the delegates, a prohibition of the boats in question must 
be considered as very unlikely, at least for the time being. 
His prognostication was confirmed when a vote on the proposal to ban the 
submarine was taken in the First Commission and resulted in five votes (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Persia, and Siam) for the prohibition with reservations; five 
votes (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Rumania) for the prohibition 
on condition of unanimity; and nine votes (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the United 
States) in the negative. Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland abstained.12 That ended 
all efforts to ban the submarine at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. It should 
be borne in mind that at this point in time most naval experts still considered 
that the submarine was a weapon to be used for coastal defense, particularly by 
the smaller and weaker nations which did not have strong navies. 13 Litde or no 
consideration was given to the fact that the submarine might be valuable as a 
commerce destroyer and on the high seas. Moreover, having failed to ban the 
submarine, inexplicably, no attempt was made to obtain even minimum 
. . . . 14 
restnctlOns on Its operatIons. 
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The 1907 Hague Peace Conference 
During the period between the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 
the major international event in the military area was the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-1905). No submarines participated in this conflict but, as one author has 
pointed out, even a few Russian short-range submarines could have done enough 
damage to the Japanese to have caused the latter to lift the blockade of Port Arthur 
and even a few of the longer-ranged ones could have effectively impeded the landing 
of Japanese troops in Korea.1S At that time, however, neither Japan nor Russia had 
any submarines in their navies. That situation would soon change.16 
The Russian agenda for the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference called for 
the "framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs of maritime 
warfare," but contained no specific mention of the submarine.17 When the 
Fourth Commission of that Conference met for the first time on June 24, 1907, 
its President, de Martens of Russia, said: "We must now do for naval warfare 
what the Second Commission of the last Peace Conference did for land 
warfare."lS While the Conference did draft a number of conventions with 
respect to war at sea, some good and some not so good, the possibility of drafting 
rules with respect to the use of submarines was not even a subject of discussion. 
Although there is a tendency on the part of writers to refer to the inability of 
both of those Hague Peace Conferences to reach agreement on restrictions on 
the use of submarines, 19 the present author could find only one passing reference 
to the subject in the proceedings of the 1907 Conference. During the lengthy 
discussion of the United States proposal to exemi6t all private property from 
capture or seizure at sea the Belgian delegate said: 
A torpedo-boat or a submarine can annihilate in a few moments a magnificent 
vessel representing an enormous ouday and a thousand lives. In 1899 Russia 
proposed that the employment of such engines of destruction be given up, just as 
the poisoning of arms and of springs had been prohibited, and most of the Powers 
seemed ready to adhere to the proposal provided it were accepted unanimously. 
But unfortunately I do not now see any indication among us of such an idea. 
No further mention of submarines could be found. It will, however, be appropriate 
to point out that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VI provided that if 
an enemy merchant ship were to be destroyed "provision must be made for the 
safety of the persons on board as well as the security of the ship's papers.,,21 
1909 Declaration of London 
Article I of this Declaration stated that "the rules contained in the following 
Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of 
internationallaw.,,22 As the Declaration was intended to be all-inclusive insofar 
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as restrictions on maritime trade during the course of a war were concerned and 
as it contained no special rules with respect to submarines, it must be assumed 
that there were at that time still no such rules?3 That being the case, submarines 
would be bound by the general rules applicable to all warships. Customary 
international law prescribed that, while a warship could be attacked without 
warning, a merchant vessel was a noncombatant which could only be attacked 
after warning and which could only be sunk under exceptional circumstances' 
and then only after the safety of the passengers and crew had been assured?4 
Although the then Lieutenant Rickover wrote in 1935 that "[i]n its official 
correspondence with the United States the German government appears not to 
have questioned the American contention that the rules of international law 
governing surface men-of-war applied also to the submarine,,,25 during World 
War I Germany actually did take issue with this conclusion. She contended that 
she had chosen to use "a new weapon, the use of which had not yet been 
regulated by international law and, in doing so, could not and did not violate 
any existing rules but only took into account the peculiarity of this new weapon, 
the submarine boat.,,26 Contrariwise, Lauterpacht took the position that "[t]he 
novelty of a weapon does not itself carry with it a legitimate claim to a change 
in the existing rules ofwar.,,27 Strange to relate, in a message of July 18, 1916 
to the British Ambassador in Washington, the British Foreign Office said: "The 
first point to be established is that international law ought not to transfer without 
modification to submarines, rules and regulations which work fairly well as 
cis ..c: Is ,,28 regar suuace vesse . 
It was during the immediate pre-World War I period that Great Britain made 
a decision which was to have far-reaching consequences with respect to the use 
of the submarine as a commerce destroyer and the disregarding of the 
requirements of warning and of assuring the safety of the passengers and crew. 
On March 26, 1913 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, 
announced in Parliament the intention of the British Government to arm its 
merchantmen, at the same time asserting that the armaments would be stricdy 
defensive and would not change the status of these vessels as noncombatant 
merchant ships, to be distinguished from converted armed merchant cruisers?9 
As we shall see, this decision had serious consequences in both World Wars, 
one being the so-called "unrestricted submarine warfare" and the subsequent 
controversy as to whether the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine 
Protocol are still binding law. 
Part II 
World War 1(1914-1918) 
In World War I the inadequacy of the law of naval warfare with respect to 
the protection of merchant vessels proved to be a matter of prime importance 
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for both belligerents and neutrals. It may well be said that while the American 
Civil War was the beginning of the era of the submarine, it only received full 
recognition as a dangerous--and controversial-naval weapon system during 
World War 1. 
On August 6, 1914, just a few days after the outbreak of World War I, 
Secretary of State Bryan sent a circular message to the belligerents asking each 
if it would be "willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by 
the Declaration of London of1909 shall be applicable during the present conflict 
in Europe.,,30 Most of the belligerents, including Germany, indicated that they 
would comply with the rules set forth in that Declaration, subject to reciprocity. 
However, Great Britain's decision to adopt these rules was made "subject to 
certain modifications and additions which they adjudge indispensable to the 
efficient conduct of their naval operations.,,31 As a result of the British position, 
the United States withdrew its suggestion.32 Primary among these British 
"modifications and additions" was a vast increase in the list of contraband 
items?3 Historically, an enemy merchant ship was a noncombatant which could 
be stopped, visited, and searched in order to examine her papers and to determine 
whether she was carrying contraband, and captured if found to be carrying 
contraband, but which could not be attacked, nor destroyed, except under 
specific and limited circumstances--and then only after the safety of the persons 
aboard had been assured. The lifeboats were not considered to be a place of 
safety unless the weather was moderate and land was within a reasonable distance, 
or another vessel was available which could take the crew and passengers of the 
doomed vessel aboard. For some months after the outbreak of World War I 
German submarines were used almost exclusively in the capacity of warship 
against warship?4 The few merchantmen which were sunk by German 
submarines during this period had suffered their fate in strict accordance with 
the customary law of naval warfare applicable to the sinking of merchant vessels 
by surface warships-they had been stopped by a warning shot, visited and 
searched, found to have contraband aboard, and the safety of passengers and 
crews had been assured before they were sunk.35 That procedure was not to 
continue. 
On November 3, 1914 the British ~ve notice that "the whole of the North 
Sea must be considered a military area.,,36 The British sea blockade of Germany 
was so effective that the German Navy urged the need to counter it by a 
declaration of a war zone around the British Isles within which all ships would 
be sunk. The Foreign Office opposed such a procedure because of its anticipated 
effect on neutrals and the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, at first 
agreed with the Foreign Office. However, early in 1915 the German 
Government determined that it had no alternative but to use the submarine to 
stop the flow of food and essential munitions to the British Isles37 and on 
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February 4, 1915 the Gennan Admiralty issued a Proclamation declaring the 
waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, 
to be a "war zone" in which, after February 18, 1915, all enemy merchant ships 
would be destroyed without assuring the safety of the passengers and crews-in 
other words, they would be sunk without warning?8 The Proclamation added 
that, because, on January 31, 1915, the British Admiralty had ordered British 
merchant vessels to fly neutral flags, even neutral merchant vessels would be at 
risk in the announced zone. A lengthy "Memorial", issued at the same time, 
justified the Gennan action as retaliation for British disregard of the provisions 
of the 1909 Declaration of London and of the 1856 Declaration ofParis39 and 
the British declaration of the North Sea between Scodand and Norway as being 
"comprised within the seat of war" combined with neutral acceptance of these 
British violations.40 It was thus that first arose a problem which continues to 
plague the Governments and navies of the world and students of the law of 
maritime warfare to this day-the question of the legality of war zones, under 
any of the various names which have been given to such areas of the high seas 
by belligerents.41 
The Gennan Proclamation caused considerable consternation in the United 
States. Robert Lansing, then Counselor of the Department of State, prepared a 
reply to the Gennan proclamation which he himself referred to as "sharp." It 
described the Gennan intention as "a wanton act unparalleled in naval 
warfare. ,,42 However, after he had read the accompanying "Memorial" he 
relented considerably. Nevertheless, the United States protest may still be 
described as "strong.'.43 The United States also protested to Great Britain the 
use of the American flag by British merchant ships.44 As neither of these protests 
accomplished its purpose, the United States proposed that each side should, 
h hi 45 among ot er t ngs, agree: 
That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality 
except to enforce the right of visit and search. 
That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags 
for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre. 
Gennany accepted this proposal with conditions. Great Britain rejected it on 
the ground that the Gennan Proclamation of February 4, 1915 was, "in effect, 
a claim to torpedo at sight"; and that submarines did not, and could not, comply 
with the well-established rules of maritime warfare, such as bringing merchant 
ships before prize courts, sinking them only when extraordinary circumstances 
existed, distinguishing between neutral and enemy ships, assuring the safety of 
crews, etc.46 Of course, the British position disregarded the fact that by accepting 
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the proposed agreement Gennany would have, in effect, consented to give up 
any claimed right to "torpedo at sight" with all of its corollaries. 
This began a campaign of submarines as commerce destroyers, a campaign 
that extended from February 1915 to September 1915, during which period 
strong protests were made to the Gennan Government by the Government of 
the United States over attacks upon and the sinking of American merchant vessels 
and of other merchant vessels on which American citizens were traveling. The 
matter reached a peak with the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 as a 
result of which over 100 American citizens were lost. The U.S. protest included 
the following statement: 47 
The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of 
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the 
objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies 
in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of 
commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and 
humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically 
impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine 
her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; 
and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without 
leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. 
After another strong protest by the United States when the Arabic was sunk on 
August 19, 1915, with American citizens aboard, Gennan submarines were 
ordered not to attack passenger ships without a warning and an opportunity for 
the passengers and crew to be taken to a place of safety.48 As this required the 
submarine to come to the surface, an extremely dangerous procedure in a 
confined area, all Gennan submarines were soon recalled from the English 
Channel. One anonymous author believes that this seven-month period 
(February-September 1915) "saw the submarine come of age as the first modem 
weapon to make war a universal scourge, rather than a professional duel between 
. al . d fl ,,49 nv anmes an eets. 
Thus, within the first year of World War I the use of the submarine had 
generated issues with respect to the anning of merchantmen, the use of false 
colors, the establishment of "war zones", the sinking of merchantmen without 
warning, and the failure to assure the safety of the passengers and crews. All of 
those issues continue to exist; only the latter two were addressed by the 1936 
London Submarine Protocol. 50 The problem of the status of merchantmen 
under convoy did not arise until much later in the war. 
Disputes with respect to submarine warfare continued to arise and finally, on 
April 18, 1916, the United States warned Gennany that if the latterintended to 
continue "to prosecute relendess and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of 
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commerce without regard to what the United States must consider the sacred 
and indisputable rules ofinternationallaw and the universally recognized dictates 
of humanity, " it would have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations.51 The 
German reply, dated May 4, 1916, notified the United States Government that 
the following instructions had been issued to German naval forces:52 
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of 
merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and 
without the area declared as [a] naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning 
and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer 
resistance. 
The following months were comparatively free ofincidents but, understandably, 
the success of the U-boats was considerably reduced. Ultimately, the German 
Government decided that its only possibility of winning the war, which had 
reached a stalemate on land, was to embark on a program of unrestricted 
submarine warfare and an announcement of such a policy was suddenly made 
on January 31, 1917, to take effect the following day.53 On February 3, 1917, 
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany;54 on March 12, 
1917, the United States announced its intention to arm its merchantmen;55 on 
April 2, 1917, in a speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war against 
Germany, President Wilson stated: "The intimation [of the German 
Government] is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our 
merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of the law and subject to be 
dealt with as pirates would be,,;56 and on April 6, 1917, the United States 
declared war on Germany. 
Because of the magnitude of the problem created by the arming of 
merchantmen during World War I, it is, perhaps, advisable to deal with it at 
some length at this point. It is a problem which was and is important to neutrals 
as well as belligerents inasmuch as Article 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention 
No. XIII,57 provides that, in general, a warship may only remain in neutral 
waters for twenty-four hours. If armed merchantmen are warships, then this rule 
applies to them and if they remain in neutral waters beyond the 
twenty-four-hour period, they are, under Article 24 of the same Convention, 
subject to internment. If they were held to fall within the ambit of those 
provisions, their utility as cargo carriers would be completely nullified as none 
could accomplish unloading and reloading within that time frame. Germany 
demanded that the United States (and other neutrals) apply the provisions of this 
Convention to British armed merchantmen. The United States declined to do 
so.58 It appears that The Netherlands was the only country that so interpreted 
and applied the cited provisions of the Hague Convention. 59 One author has 
taken the position that "neutrals are not justified in treating an armed merchant 
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vessel as an innocent peaceful carrier. By so doing they risk their neutrality.,,60 
A major work argues that neutral states "employed the convenient but elusive 
and tenuous distinction between 'offensive' and 'defensive' armament" because 
of their desire to avoid the need to apply the provisions of the 1907 Hague 
Convention No. XIII to armed belligerent merchantmen.61 
The provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention No. vn62 require, among 
other things, that merchant vessels converted into warships must be placed under 
the direct authority of the State and must have a commander who is "in the 
Service of the State and duly commissioned by the competent authorities" and 
a crew which is subject to military discipline. When the British ordered the 
arming of all of their merchant vessels, many of the captains and other officers 
of these vessels held commissions in the Royal Navy Reserves and many of the 
vessels were subsequendy furnished with Royal Navy gun crews. Nevertheless, 
the British Government contended that these vessels were armed solely for 
defensive purposes and that, therefore, these facts did not make them armed 
auxiliary cruisers. The British were probably correct in contending that the status 
of the officers and men did not bring the vessel within the provisions of this 
Hague Convention. The vessels were not State vessels and the crews, other than 
the gunners, were not subject to military discipline. However, whether the fact 
that they were armed removed them from the category of vessels entided to the 
protections of customary international law is an altogether different question. 
It is often believed that the original decision of the British Government to 
arm its merchant ships was reached as a measure of protection against submarines. 
This is not so. In March 1913, when Churchill made his announcement in the 
House of Commons,63 the British were not concerned with submarines, they 
were concerned with converted merchant auxiliary cruisers. Thus he said:64 
There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign 
merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting 
of guns .... Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following 
these trade routes would in certain contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and 
equipped in the manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they 
would be at the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one effective gun and a few 
rounds of ammunition .... Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be 
covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed 
merchantman is another merchantman armed in its own defence. 
Again, a year later, on March 17, 1914, he said:65 
The House will expect me to say a few words on the arming of merchant ships. 
Much misconception has arisen on this subject .... Forty ships have been armed 
with two 4.7 guns apiece, and by the end of1914-1915 seventy ships will have 
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been so anned. They are anned solely for defensive purposes. The guns are 
mounted in the stem and can only fire on a pursuer. Vessels so anned have nothing 
in common with merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty and converted 
into commissioned auxiliary cruisers, nor are these vessels privateers or commerce 
destroyers in any sense. They are exclusively ships which carry food to this country. 
They are not allowed to fight any ship of war .... They are, however, thoroughly 
capable of self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantmen. 
During the years that it was a neutral in World War I, the position of the 
United States with respect to anned merchantmen was so ambivalent as to leave 
much to be desired. However, as it was one of the main players with respect to 
the problem, it will be ofinterest to analyze the pennutations and combinations 
which were encountered in the negotiations on this subject and the decisions 
which were made and unmade. 
Within a few days after the beginning of the war the British Charge d'Affaires 
in Washington called the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that "a 
certain number" of British merchant vessels were anned "solely for the purpose 
of defence. ,,66 Two weeks later, the British Ambassador advised the Secretary 
of State that he had been directed to give the United States: 
the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes 
of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for purposes of defence, 
that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any 
. k l~ CIrcumstances attac any vesse . 
Despite these assurances, it does not appear that the anned merchantmen used 
their guns solely for defense, nor that the British Government expected them 
to do so. Thus, confidential instructions to masters of armed merchant vessels 
stated:68 
If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day and it is evident to the master 
that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defence, 
notwithstanding the submarines [sic] may not have committed a definite hostile 
act, such as firing a gun or torpedo. 
Any submarine approaching a merchant vessel may be treated as hostile.69 
Moreover, when they became available, merchant ships were supplied with 
depth charges, definitely an offensive weapon?O 
In justification of the practice of arming merchant ships, and in support of 
their contention that this did not remove them from a noncombatant status, the 
British frequendy referred to the long history of anned merchant ships, pointing 
out that this had been ordered by Royal Proclamation as early as the seventeenth 
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century and that this right had been recognized by Prize Courts during the 
Napoleonic Wars.71 They omitted to mention that this procedure had been 
directed against pirates and privateers and that there were no longer pirates on 
the well-traveled trade routes which the British ships were traversing and that 
privateering had been prohibited by the 1856 Declaration ofParis.72 
Lauterpacht, while a strong supporter of the right of a belligerent to arm its 
merchant ships for defensive purposes, added the following caveat?3 
At the same time it is clear that the arming of merchant vessels raises problems of 
substantial difficulty. In the first place, it is not easy to draw a line of distinction 
between offensive and defensive acts. Secondly, the encouragement of even 
defensive hostilities on the part of private vessels is fraught with danger inasmuch 
as it threatens to undermine the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of 
Paris of 1856 [and the distinction?] between commissioned and 
non-commissioned vessels. Thirdly, the fact that a merchantman is armed and that 
she is entitled to resist actual or anticipated attack makes it impossible for enemy 
submarines to exercise their right of visit and capture in accordance with 
International Law without running the risk of destruction by the superior 
armament of the merchant vessel or being rammed by her. 
On September 19, 1914 the Department of State issued a memorandum, 
prepared by Robert Lansing, entitled "The Status of Armed Merchant Vessels," 
which provided that, while a merchant vessel might carry armament and 
ammunition for defensive purposes without becoming a warship, the presence 
of such items aboard would create a presumption that they were for offensive 
purposes, a presumption that could be overcome by showing that the vessel 
carried its armament for defensive purposes only. The memorandum then 
proceeded to list a number of "indications" that the armament would not be 
used offensively, including such items as the size and number of the guns, their 
location on the vessel, the status of the officers and crew, etc?4 With one 
amendment which provided that the presence of any gun on a merchantman, 
no matter what its size, would create the presumption of offensive use,75 this 
memorandum laid down the policy followed by the United States during 1914 
and 1915. 
OnJanuary 7, 1916, Lansing, now the Secretary of State, sent a memorandum 
to President Wilson in which he pointed out the potential danger to submarines 
of even a small caliber gun on an armed merchantman; that if submarines were 
to be required to give warning to merchant vessels, the latter should not be 
armed; and that armed merchantmen should, therefore, be treated as not 
possessing the immunities of private commercial vessels.76 President Wilson 
concurred with these conclusions and, on January 18, 1916, Lansing circulated 
an informal letter to the belligerents in which he set forth the general rules of 
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international law and humanity understood to be applicable to noncombatant 
merchant vessels during a war. He called attention to the manner in which the 
submarine had changed maritime operations and the dangers it faced when 
compelled to stop and search an armed merchant vessel on the high seas. He 
h ·d77 t en Sal : 
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels 
of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequendy, the placing of guns 
on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only 
on the ground of a purpose to render a merchantman superior in force to 
submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. An armament, 
therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive 
armament. 
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement 
ifit could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused 
to adhere stricdy to the rules of intemationallaw in the matter of stopping and 
searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and 
removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as 
prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be 
prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever. 
I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the 
argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the 
character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, 
should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by 
a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials 
accordingly. 
If the paragraph last quoted was intended to put pressure on Great Britain to 
agree to the basic suggestion, as it undoubtedly was, it did not accomplish its 
purpose. While the British Government's adamant opposition to the proposal 
of the United States had probably previously been conveyed orally, it was not 
until March 23, 1916 that the British Ambassador delivered to the Secretary of 
State a memorandum from the British Government setting forth in some detail, 
not always relevant, the reasons why that Government believed the proposal to 
be pro-German, why it could not rely on a "non-guaranteed German promise", 
and why it could not, therefore, accept the proposal made some two months 
earlier. It also presented its reasons why it did not consider that the action 
mentioned in the last ~aragraph of the American note would be in accordance 
\vith international law. 8 The Germans also rejected the proposal, asserting that 
it was pro-British?9 The British won both battles: they continued to arm their 
merchantmen; and these armed merchantmen continued to be treated by the 
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United States as ordinary merchant vessels "armed for defense only." On March 
25, 1916, just two days after the date of the British memorandum, the 
Department of State issued a new "Memorandum on the Status of Armed 
Merchant Vessels" which was even more lenient on the subject than the 1914 
memorandum had been. Two pertinent paragraphs provided:80 
The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be 
determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of 
previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances 
of the case. 
Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for the purposes of protection 
against the enemy, are entided to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance 
in the course oflegitimate trade. 
In passing, it is worthy of note with respect to this problem that when, in 
1928, the members of the then Pan American Union drafted a convention on 
the subject of maritime neutrality, Article 12(3) provided that the rules relating 
to warships would apply to armed merchantmen. The United States ratified the 
C ··th . h .. 81 onventlon WI a reservatlon to t at proVISlon. 
In conclusion, it might be said that "defensively armed merchant vessels" 
were properly so-called in that, unlike auxiliary merchant cruisers, they did not 
go searching for enemy vessels; they were not properly so-called in that they 
usually opened fire immediately upon sighting a U-boat, before it had taken any 
offensive action other than to make its appearance. It should be obvious that the 
present author agrees with the following statement:82 
The criteria [for determining whether a merchant vessel is participating in the 
hostilities] should certainly include, inter alia, any armed merchant vessel and no 
consideration should be given to the purported distinction between "defensive" 
and "offensive" armament. 
As we shall see, this same problem arose during the course of World War II.83 
Part III 
The Intra-War Period (1919-1939) 
The Versailles Treaty 
In the course of drafting a suggested basic document for the proposed League 
of Nations, to be submitted to the Peace Conference which met at the end of 
World War I, President Woodrow Wilson sought comments from David H. 
Miller, the Legal Adviser of the American Delegation to the Conference. In his 
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comments on Wilson's Second Draft, Miller suggested the inclusion of the 
£11 ' •. 84 o oWIng provlSlon: 
The Contracting Parties agree never to make use of anned submarines in naval 
operations, and further agree that they will hereafter build no submarines anned 
or capable of being anned and further agree that all submarines now in existence 
or under construction shall be dismantled and rendered incapable of being anned 
or shall be destroyed. 
Wilson did not adopt this suggestion and while Article 191 of the Treaty oj 
Versailles85 which ended World War I as between Germany and the Allies, 
specifically prohibited "[t]he construction or acquisition of any submarine, even 
for commercial purposes" by Germany, the Covenant of the League of Nations 
contained no provision on the subject. As events proved, this provision of the 
Treaty, like many of the other provisions thereof, was of little value.86 
The 1921-1922 Washington Conference 
In 1921 a Conference on the Limitation of Armament met in Washington. 
The conferees represented the five major victorious Powers in World War I: 
France, Great Britain (and the Commonwealth countries), Italy, Japan, and the 
United States. When the discussion with respect to submarines began, the British 
Delegation took the position that "what was required was not merely restrictions 
on submarines, but their total and final abolition. ,,87 The French delegation was, 
as it had been in the past, particularly opposed to the banning of the submarine 
as an accepted naval weapons system, its delegate saying:88 
The French Government believes that every method of warfare mayor may not 
be employed in conformity with the laws of war, and that the inhuman and 
barbarous use made of the submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason 
for condemning that belligerent, but not for condemning the submarine. 
It quickly became obvious that the British proposal would not receive the 
necessary support. As one commentator on the 1922 Diplomatic Conference 
stated: "The British seem to hold that the submarine is an offensive weapon, 
while the others consider that it is a defensive weapon. ,,89 Elihu Root, one of 
the delegates of the United States and a former Secretary of State, then submitted 
several proposed resolutions to the Conference. These resolutions may be 
considered to have been the genesis of the 1922, 1930, and 1936 codifications 
of the rules relating to submarine warfare. Resolution I was said to be a statement 
of existing law, while Resolution II was said to constitute a change in the existing 
law.90 An examination of the Root Resolutions, as minimally modified by the 
Conference, will enable us to determine what the rules of submarine warfare 
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were then considered to be and what the representatives of the nations present 
considered that they should be, it being an accepted fact that the submarine was 
here to stay. 
Root's Resolution 191 became Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty then in process 
of being drafted, with only one major change: the logical addition of a second 
condition under which a merchant vessel might be attacked (when it refused 
"to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed cifter seizure"). 92 
As adopted and included in the Treaty which was ultimately drafted,93 these 
articles stated: 
Art. 1. The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time 
of war, the following are to be deemed an established part ofintemationallaw; 
(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine 
its character before it can be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and 
search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have 
been first placed in safety. 
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the 
universal rules above stated; and if a submarine can not capture a vessel in 
conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from 
attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 
Art. 2. The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their 
assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear 
public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which 
the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. 
The provisions of Article 1 have since been accepted as binding rules of the law 
of war at sea by reiteration in substance in international agreemen~ subsequently 
drafted. It will become apparent that they formed the basis for the provisions of 
Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty94 and for those of its offipring, the 
1936 London Submarine Protoco1.95 
There can be no question but that the provisions of Root's Resolution n96 
represented a major addition to the restrictions on the use of submarines in war 
at sea. It condemned the submarine for what a belligerent had done in World 
War 1. It was adopted as Article 4 of the Treaty with only minor amendments 
which did not affect its substantive content. It read: 
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Art. 4. The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using 
submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in 
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the 
end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be 
universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that 
prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other 
nations to adhere thereto. 
This Article, outlawing the use of submarines against merchant vessels, even if 
they complied with the provisions of Article 1, did not survive as a rule of the 
law of war. Had it done so, it would, as Root had indicated, have supplanted 
the rules set forth in Article 1, rules which codified then existing law. 
Root's Resolution m97 was adopted as Article 3 of the Treaty with only one 
major change. That change was the substitution of the words "rules declared by 
them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant 
ships" for the words "rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition of 
the use of submarines in time of war." Under either reading, the provisions 
cover violations of both Articles 1 and 4 of the Treaty. As Article 3 it now read: 
Art. 3. The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane 
rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure 
and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service 
of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is 
under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the 
laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and 
may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within 
the jurisdiction of which he may be found. 
During the discussion of this Resolution the Japanese delegate asked for an 
explanation of the meaning of the phrase "punishment as iffor an act of piracy." 
The ambiguity of the phrase was demonstrated by the fact that the Chainnan, 
Secretary of State Hughes, said that he assumed that it meant that a violation 
should be treated as an act of piracy. Root was quick to indicate that it merel~ 
meant that there would be universal jurisdiction, as in the case of piracy.9 
Inasmuch as the provision already specifically so provided, there was, in reality, 
no need for the reference to piracy which merely caused confusion and antipathy. 
Like Article 4, Article 3 has not survived as a separate rule of the law of war. 
However, like any other violation of the law of war, violations of the provisions 
of the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare constitute universal 
war crimes and the violator may still "be brought to trial before the civil or 
military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be 
found"-depending, of course, on the domestic law of that Power. In fact, as 
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we shall see, after W orId War II two Gennan Admirals, Doenitz and Raeder, 
were charged with and tried for having allegedly ordered illegal submarine 
warfare. 
In its final fonn this 1922 Washington Treaty (which also contained a 
provision banning the use of noxious gases) included in its Article VI a provision 
which stated that it would "take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications." 
Inasmuch as France failed to ratify it, the Treaty never took effect.99 Perhaps 
this was just as well. Admiral William V. Pratt, of the United States Navy, is 
quoted as having written, a few days after the Conference ended, that the treaty 
was not practical and that it would not work.100 
This Diplomatic Conference created a Commission of Jurists with the task 
of determining the adequacy of certain rules of international law with respect 
to the law of war.10l The Commission produced two sets of rules, one on 
wireless telegraphy in time of war and one on aerial warfare. Article 6, paragraph 
102 1, of the fonner stated 
The wireless transmission, by an enemy or neutral vessel or aircraft while being 
on or above the high seas, of any military information intended for a belligerent's 
immediate use, shall be considered a hostile act exposing the vessel or aircraft to 
be fired at; 
As the Diplomatic Conference had adjourned sine die before the Commission 
completed its work, neither set of rules ever received codified international 
status. However, they undoubtedly represented the customary international law 
on the subjects and are worthy of and have received considerable attention, 
d . th· . fc al 103 esplte elr m onn status. 
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Inter-American Convention on Maritime 
Neutralityl04 sets forth in considerable detail the rules with respect to the rights 
of belligerent warships towards merchant vessels, including a provision that a 
ship may not be rendered unnavigable before the crew and passengers have been 
placed in safety. Paragraph 2 makes these rules applicable to submarines with 
the specific proviso that "[i]f the submarine cannot capture the ship while 
observing these rules, it shall not have the right to continue to attack or to destroy 
th hi ,,105 e s p. 
The 1930 London Naval Conference 
On January 21, 1930 another Conference on the Limitation of Annament 
convened, this time in London. It was officially known as the London Naval 
Conference of 1930. The participating Powers were the same as those which 
had been represented in Washington eight years earlier. At the very first Plenary 
Meeting at which the subject of submarines was discussed the British once again 
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proposed the abolition of the submarine, this time with the full support of the 
United States; and once again this proposal received the support of all of the 
Commonwealth countries, but the opposition of France, Italy, and Japan.106 
The United States had submitted a proposed resolution calling for the 
appointment of a committee to consider (1) the abolition of the submarine; and 
(2) regulation of the use of the submarine "through subjecting it to the rules of 
war governing the use of surface craft." France had submitted a proposed 
resolution "forbidding submarines to act towards merchant ships otherwise than 
in strict conformity with the rules, either present or future, to be observed by 
surface warships." 107 These resolutions were referred to a Committee of Experts 
and a Committee of Jurists. The latter produced a Declaration108 which was 
approved unanimously by the First Committee and which was approved without 
di . b h PI M· 109 A . d . h T 110 . SCUSSlon y t e enary eetmg. s mcorporate mto t e reaty, It 
read:111 
Art. 22. The following are accepted as established rules ofIntemational Law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must confonn to 
the rules ofInternational Law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface 
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place 
of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety 
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and 
weather conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel 
which is in a position to take them aboard. 
These rules were, in general, a rephrasing and amplification of the rules which 
had been included in Article 1 of the 1922 Washington TreatyY2 It is important 
to note that while, pursuant to Article 23, the other provisions of the Treaty 
ceased to be effective on December 31, 1936, Article 22 was "to remain in force 
without limitation of time." Despite the fact that there was a provision for 
accession to Part IV of the Treaty by other Powers, no non-Conference Power 
ever acceded, perhaps because France and Italy did not ratify these provisions 
until 1936. 
In addition to drafting the Declaration which became Article 22 of the Treaty, 
the Committee of Jurists made a statement which bears repeating. It said: 
The Committee wishes to place it on record that the expression merchant vessels 
where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be understood as including a 
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merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in the hostilities in such a 
manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel. l13 
This would certainly include the merchant vessel which, when a submarine 
surfaces in its vicinity, immediately opens fire or radios that it has sighted a 
b . ... 1 . d d 1 . d 114 su manne, gtvmg Its ongttu e an at1tu e. 
The 1935-1936 London Naval Conference 
In 1935 another Diplomatic Conference convened in London to draft a new 
treaty limiting naval armament prior to the expiration of the 1930 London Naval 
Treaty. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol115 is frequendy associated with 
the 1935-1936 London Naval Conference and with the Treaz for the Limitation 
of Naval Armament that was drafted at that Conference. 11 Its relationship to 
that Conference and Treaty is rather tenuous. At the opening session of the 
Conference Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, said:117 
There is one further point that I should like to mention, because it appears to me 
very encouraging for our future deliberations. If it proves impossible to obtain 
agreement for the abolition of submarines, it is of vital importance to reach an 
agreement which will prevent their misuse. Part IV of the London Naval Treaty 
laid down rules for the treatment of merchant ships by submarines in time of war. 
These rules are already in force between the United States, Japan and the members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But I am glad to be able to announce, 
as a result of the preliminary talks with representatives of other nations, that, once 
these rules have been incorporated in an instrunlent which will be distinct from 
the London Naval Treaty, the French and Italian Governments who were unable 
to ratify the London Treaty as a whole will be in a position definitely to accept 
such an instrument. We hope that this will be the signal for the acceptance of 
these rules by all the maritime Powers of the world and that, by this means, 
unrestricted submarine warfare may in the future be averted. 
However, at the Fifteenth Meeting of the First Committee, held on March 13, 
1936, the French delegate found it necessary to stateYS 
I am surprised not to see on the Agenda a subject on which we appeared all to be 
agreed at the opening meeting of the Conference and which our First Committee 
has not yet examined, namely, the embodiment in the Acts which our Conference 
is to draw up of the rules of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty [of 1930], 
concerning the use of submarines against merchant vessels. 
The British representative pointed out that the two treaties were quite separate 
(the Japanese had left the Conference and would not sign the Naval Treaty but 
would sign the Submarine Protocol) and that as another text had to be prepared 
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they could only hope that the two could be signed at the same timeY9 As a 
matter of fact they were not, the Treaty being signed on March 25, 1936, and 
the Protocol more than seven months later, on November 6, 1936. On the latter 
date it (the Protocol) was signed by the five nations which had participated in 
the drafting of both the 1930 and the 1936 London Naval Treaties: France, 
Great Britain (and the Commonwealth Nations), Italy, Japan, and the United 
States. Other nations were invited to accede to the Protocol and approximately 
37 others had done so before World War II erupted, including all of the 
European belligerents in that war except Rumania. Japan was a Party, but China 
was not. Germany had acceded on November 23, 1936.120 
The Nyon Agreements 
The Spanish Civil War which began in 1936 was the first such conflict since 
the American Civil War in which submarines played a part. Because of their 
method of operation, which included attacks on and the sinking of merchant 
ships which did not belong to either side in the conflict, a number of concerned 
nations met at Nyon, Switzerland, in 1937 and drafted the Nyon Agreement. 
Thi ·d d 121 s agreement provl e : 
II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship [one not belonging to either side 
in the conflict] in a manner contrary to the rules referred to in the International 
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London 
on April 22, 1930 and confinned in the Protocol signed in London on 
November 6,1936, shall be counter-attacked and, ifpossible, destroyed. 
In effect, the Parties to this Agreement were demanding that the contestants in 
a civil war comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine 
Protoco1.122 (A Supplementary Agreement, signed three days later, made the 
original agreement applicable to surface vessels and aircraft.) Nine European and 
Mediterranean States were Parties to these agreements. (Understandably, this 
did not include Germany and Italy, both of which were actively supporting the 
Franco insurgents who probably controlled all of the submarines involved.) 
Shortly thereafter, on 5 October 1937, the Council of the League of Nations 
adopted a Resolution which stated:123 
(7) Notes that attacks have taken place in violation of the most elementary 
dictates of humanity underlying the established rules of international law which 
are affinned, so far as war time is concerned, in Part IV of the Treaty of London 
of April 22, 1930, rules which have been formally accepted by the great majority 
of Governments. 
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(8) Declares that all attacks of this kind against any merchant vessels are 
repugnant to the conscience of the civilised nations which now find expression 
through the Council. 
It is strange that the League's Council referred to the 1930 Treaty, which had 
only a few ratifications, and not to the 1936 Protocol, which, by this time, had 
more than twenty-five ratifications and accessions. 
Part IV 
World War II and Its Aftermath (1939-1947) 
As in the case ofW orId War I, the British Admiralty had prepared for another 
conflict by ensuring that many of its merchant ships had been built with 
reinforced areas for the mounting of guns and by storing guns to be used for 
arming those ships.124 Moreover, the 1938 British Defense of Merchant Shipping 
Handbook included the following provisions:125 
As soon as the Master of a merchant ship realises that a ship or aircraft in sight is 
an enemy, it is his first and most important duty to report the nature and position 
of the enemy by wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the 
means of saving not only the ship herself but many others; ... 
Conditions under which fire may be opened: 
(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with International Law-As the 
armament is solely for the purpose of self-defence, it must only be used against an 
enemy who is clearly attempting to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the 
outbreak of war it should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with 
International Law, and fire should therefore not be opened until he has made it 
plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it is clear that resistance will be 
necessary if capture is to be averted, fire should be opened immediately. 
(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of International Law-If, as the war 
progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that, in defiance ofIntemational Law, 
the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning, it 
will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine, or 
aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will 
prevent her gaining a favorable position for attacking. 
According to a British history ofW orId War II "between the outbreak of the 
war and November 4 [1939], thirty-two British and three Allied ships had been 
sunk illegally ... ; as many as thirty-three neutral ships had been attacked and at 
least sixteen sunk in circumstances which led to the conclusion that the sinking 
had been illegal." 126 
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In his Memoirs, Admiral Doenitz, the Commander of the U-boat arm of the 
German Navy for a large part of the war, later the Commander-in-Chief of the 
German Navy, and, ultimately, Hider's successor, asserts that these Instructions 
were "a contravention of the Submarine Agreement." He also indicates his belief 
that the convoy system was contrary to the same Agreement. 127 Neither arming 
merchant ships, nor ordering them to send by radio what can only be described 
as intelligence information, nor sailing them in convoy under the protection of 
warships, were acts contrary to the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine 
Protocol-but any of those acts removed the particular merchant ship involved 
from the limited category of ships protected by that Agreement. 128 
On November 27, 1939 the British Government issued an Order in Council 
Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany which was intended, among 
other things, to eliminate all German exports.129 In response to neutral 
complaints of violation of the 1856 Declaration of Paris,130 the British 
Government said in notes to the Dutch and Italian Governments that "the main 
basis of their actions is admittedly the right of retaliation the essence of which 
is a departure from the ordinary rules as reprisal for illegal action by the 
enemy.,,131 This was, of course, an admission by the British that the Order in 
Council did, in fact, violate the 1856 Declaration of Paris and a claim that it 
was, nevertheless, legal because by definition a reprisal contemplates an illegal 
. b h d rtaki . al . 132 actlon y t e party un e ng repns actlon. 
On May 8, 1940, Churchill, once again First Lord of the Admiralty, stated 
to the House of Commons that the Royal Navy had been instructed that in the 
Skagerrak (a narrow arm of the North Sea between Denmark and Norway 
leading into the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea) "all German ships by day and all 
hi b . h b nk . d ,,133 Thi . s ps y rug t were to e su as opporturuty serve . s actlon was 
frequendy referred to by the Germans as a basis for their subsequent actions.134 
Although the International Military Tribunal found Doenitz guilty of violating 
the 1936 London Submarine Protocol by establishing operational zones, it listed 
Churchill's order as one ground for not assessing punishment against Doenitz 
on the basis of German submarine warfare.135 
On August 28, 1939, a few days before the outbreak of World War II, 
Germany had issued its Prize Ordinance136 which included some of the 
protections provided by the 1936 London Submarine Protocol. A week later, 
on September 3, 1939, Hider issued Fuehrer's Directive No.2, which provided 
that offensive actions by the German Navy against Great Britain were permissible 
but that "warfare against merchant shipping is for the time being to be conducted 
di th . gul. al b b . ,,137 F h 'D· . accor ng to e pnze re atlons, so y su mannes. ue rer s lrectlve 
No.4, September 25, 1939, extended this directive to include the French.138 
The minutes of a conference between Hider and Admiral Raeder, Chief of 
the Naval Staff, held on September 23, 1939, reveal the following decisions: 139 
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2. The intensification of anti-submarine measures by aircraft and armed 
merchant vessels will apparently make it impossible to search British merchantmen 
in the future. The Fuehrer approved the proposal that action should be taken 
without previous warning against enemy merchant ships definitely identified as 
such (with the exception of unmistakable passenger steamers), since it may be 
assumed that they are armed. 
3. The expression 'submarine warfare' is to be replaced by the expression 'war 
against merchant shipping.' The notorious expression 'unrestricted submarine 
warfare' is to be avoided. Instead of this, the proclamation of the 'siege of England' 
is under consideration; such a military system would free us from having to observe 
any restrictions whatsoever on account of objections based on International Law. 
Fuehrer's Directive No.5, September 30, 1939, implemented these decisions. 
I 'd d 140 t proVl e : 
The war against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to 
prize law, with the following excep'tions. 
(1) Merchantmen and troopships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be 
attacked without warning. 
(2) The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the 
British Isles. 
(3) Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio 
transmitters when stopped. 
(4) As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large 
steamships as appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers as well as goods. 
Even assuming that "hostile" merely meant "enemy," the first part of the first 
exception (merchantmen, not anned merchantmen) was a violation of the 
Protocol; the second part of that exception (troopships) was valid; the second 
exception was probably justified;141 the third was undoubtedly justified;142 and 
the fourth was intended to avoid incidents such as that of the Lusitania in World 
War I and of the Athenia in World War 11.143 
During World War II Gennany contended that its use of the submarine as a 
commerce destroyer Was a legal reprisal because of such British violations of the 
law of naval warfare as arming merchant vessels, ordering them to radio reports 
of submarine sightings, ordering them to navigate without lights at night, 
ordering them to ram submarines, violations of the rules pertaining to blockades, 
144 Th . hi M . D' 145 etc. us, In s emOlrs, oerutz wrote: 
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In the same way Naval High Command reacted only with extreme caution and 
step by step to the British measures which I have just described and which 
constituted a breach of the London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by 
one the restrictions on the conduct of U-boat operations were removed in a series 
of orders from Naval High Command-beginning with permission to fire upon 
vessels which used their wireless, which sailed without lights and which carried 
guns, followed (as a result' of the instructions to ram given to British ships) by 
permission to attack all vessels identified as hostile and ending with a declaration 
of sea areas that would be regarded as operational zones .... 
It is, then, an established fact that from the very outset the German Naval High 
Command painstakingly adhered to the provisions ofintemationallaw contained 
in the London agreements and that it was only step by step, in response to breaches 
of these provisions by the enemy, that we allowed ourselves more and more 
latitude, until finally, we reached the stage, as it was inevitable that we would, 
where the London agreement was abandoned completely and for good. 
Actually, there was no need for Gennany to place its actions on a reprisal 
basis.146 The British modus operandi constituted their merchant vessels naval 
auxiliaries, subject to the same treatment as warships - that of being attacked 
without warning immediately upon being sighted. As one author has stated, the 
provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol did not extend, and were 
not intended to extend, to the "warshiplike merchantmen" of the British 
merchant marine.147 Many publicists are of the opinion that these, and other, 
British procedures changed the status of anned British merchantmen from 
noncombatants to combatants, that it integrated them into the British naval 
forces, and that the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol were, 
therefore, no longer applicable to them.148 The Commander's Handbook on the 
LawoJNaval Operations, issued by the United States Navy in 1987, states:149 
During World War II the practice of attacking and sinking enemy merchant vessels 
by surface warships, submarines, and military aircraft without prior warning and 
without first providing for the safety of passengers and crew was widespread on 
both sides. Rationale for these apparent departures from the agreed rules of the 
1936 London Protocol varied. Initially, such acts were justified as reprisals against 
illegal acts of the enemy. As the war progressed, however, merchant ships were 
regularly armed and convoyed, participated in intelligence collection, and were 
otherwise incorporated direcdy or indirecdy into the enemy's war-fighting/war 
sustaining effort. Consequendy, enemy merchant vessels were widely regarded as 
legitimate military targets subject to destruction on sight. 
Shortly after the beginning of World War II the United States Congress 
enacted a Neutrality Act which, among other things, authorized the President 
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to place restrictions "on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United 
States by the submarines or armed merchantmen of a foreign state." It also made 
it unlawful for foreign vessels to fly the American flag (a rather difficult provision 
to enforce) and authorized the President to designate "combat areas" within 
which American flag vessels were forbidden to proceed.150 A Presidential 
Proclamation issued immediately thereafter placed such restrictions on the use 
of American p'orts and territorial waters on submarines, but not on armed 
merchantmen!151 Unlike the situation during World War I, the entrance into 
the ports of the United States by armed British merchantmen from the early 
days of World War II did not seem to cause the Administration any concern 
and was completely uncontrolled. From the very beginning of the war these 
vessels were treated as peaceable cargo ships and Borchard's strong ~rotest 
appears to have occasioned little comment and no change of policy. 1 This 
must be considered as one of the many indications of official American political 
policy favoring the British, rather than as a thoughtful interpretation of the 
applicable law. 
In accordance with the authority granted by the Neutrality Act, President 
Roosevelt also issued a Proclamation designating a "combat area" within which 
American flag vessels were forbidden to navigate.153 Germany availed itself of 
this combat zone and declared its zone, within which all vessels would be sunk 
without warning, to coincide with the American zone. During his 
cross-examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, before 
the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz testified: 154 
I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat 
zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering 
damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration 
would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition 
or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exacdy the same way as an enemy 
transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to tum the seas around the enemy's 
country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law, 
although I am only a soldier. 
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe: I see. 
Doenitz: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. Whoever 
enters a comb~t area must take the consequences. 
During this cross-examination Doenitz was also asked, "If you sank a neutral 
ship which had come into that [declared operational] zone, you considered that 
you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to 
look after the safety of the crews?" To this, he replied: "In operational areas I 
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am obliged to take care of the survivors after an engagement, if the military 
" . ,,155 
sltuallon permlts. 
In finding Doenitz guilty of violating the 1936 London Submarine Protocol 
by virtue of the German establishment of "operational zones," the International 
Military Tribunal stated that the conferees in Washington in 1922, in London 
in 1930, and in London again in 1936, had had full knowledge of the fact that 
"operational zones" (or "war zones," or "exclusion zones," or "combat zones," 
under whatever name one may give to them), had been declared by both sides 
during World War I, "[y]et the protocol made no exception" for them. 156 It is 
of interest to note that there was no mention whatsoever of such zones during 
the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the provisions of the 1922 
Washington Treaty, nor of those of the 1930 London Naval Treaty whic~ 
became the 1936 London Submarine Protocol; and that there were no 
discussions whatsoever involved in the drafting of the Protocol itsel£ Would it 
not be just as logical to interpret all this as indicating that there 'Yas no intention 
on the part of the draftsmen of those agreements to legislate with respect to this 
problem, which went far beyond submarine warfare in the scope of its 
application, that there was no desire or authority on their part to establish rules 
in an area which did not relate exclusively to submarine warfare?157 Moreover, 
while the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty of waging unrestricted submarine 
warfare on what amounted to a tu quoque defense, it failed to find him not guilty 
of the use of operational zones on that same basis despite undisputed evidence 
that the British practice in this respect was identical with, and had preceded, that 
of the Germans.15S 
There is one aspect of submarine warfare which appears to warrant mention 
even though there can be no question as to the criminal liability of any person 
engaged in it: the murder of the shipwrecked crews and passengers of ships which 
have been sunk. This problem arose during World War II because of an incident 
involving the Laconia, a British ship which was sunk in September 1942 by a 
German submarine which then discovered that a large number of Italian 
prisoners of war had been among those on board. The submarine took in tow 
several lifeboats (as it happened, the occupants of the lifeboats included a 
substantial number of members of the British crew), with a large Red Cross 
displayed, and sent a message, in English in the clear, asking for assistance in the 
rescue efforts, promising to take no aggressive action against any vessel coming 
to render assistance as long as none was taken against his U-boat. Unfortunately, 
the only response was by an American bomber which attacked and damaged 
the U-boat, causing it to cast the lifeboats adrift and to submerge.159 When this 
was reported to Doenitz he issued the so-called "Laconia Order" which 
'd d 160 provl e : 
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(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, 
and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, 
righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter 
to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and 
crews. 
(2) Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still apply. 
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance 
for your boat. 
(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for women and 
children in his bombing attacks on German cities. 
At Nuremberg the British prosecutor contended that this was an order to destroy 
any survivors of the ships sunk by German submarines, contending that this had 
long been German submarine policy. Evidence was adduced of a conversation 
between Hitler and Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, which the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East reported as follows: 161 
OSHIMA had a conference with Hitler on January 3,1942. Hitler explained his 
policy of submarine warfare, which he was conducting against Allied shipping, 
and said that although the United States might build ships very quickly, her chief 
problem would be the personnel shortage since the training of seafaring personnel 
took a long time. Hitler explained that he had given orders for his submarines to 
surface after torpedoing merchant ships and to shoot up the lifeboats, so that the 
word would get around that most seamen were lost in torpedoings and the United 
States would have difficulty in recruiting new crews. OSHIMA, in replying to 
Hitler, approved this statement of policy and stated that the Japanese would follow 
this method of waging submarine warfare. 
Concerning this matter the International Military Tribunal said:162 
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not carry out the 
warning and rescue provisions of the protocol but that Doenitz deliberately 
ordered the killing of the survivors of shipwrecked vessels, whether enemy or 
neutral. The prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders 
ofDoenitz, war order No.154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order 
of 1942. The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them 
do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The 
Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty 
required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors. 
The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure. 
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The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [of the 1936 Protocol] were 
not carried out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be carried 
out. The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the 
first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the development of aircraft made 
rescue impossible. This may be so, but the protocol is explicit. If the commander 
cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should 
allow it to pass hannless before his periscope. These orders, then, prove Doentiz 
is guilty of a violation of the protocol. 
To summarize, in passing up~n the charges of illegal submarine warfare made 
against German Admiral Doenitz, the International Military Tribunal discussed 
and reached decisions on four asjects of the question: 1) waging unrestricted 
submarine warfare (not guilty);16 2) the proclamation of operational zones and 
the sinking of neutral merchant ships therein (guilty); 3) ordering that the 
shipwrecked be killed (not guilty); and 4) failure to rescue the shipwrecked 
(guilty). However, because of the evidence of a number of British and American 
practices, no sentence was assessed against Doenitz for the foregoing offenses of 
which he was found guilty.164 
What were the reasons for the failure to comply with the rules of customary 
international law with respect to submarine warfare during the course ofW orId 
War I and for the failure to comply with those rules, as codified in the 1936 
London Submarine Protocol, during the course ofWorId War II? One student 
of the problem has answered that question as follows: 165 
The non-observance of the rules of the Protocol could be explained with the help 
of military considerations: impossibility for the aircraft to act in conformity with 
the rules, impossibility for the German surface warships to penetrate into and 
effectively control the waters surrounding the British Isles, and, as far as submarines 
were concerned, the unacceptable risk involved in the procedure of surfacing, 
ascertaining the character of the ship and cargo, ordering the ship to be abandoned 
and waiting until the order was carried out and those on board as well as the papers 
and mail were safe in the ship's boats, in an area where the superior enemy forces, 
warned with the aid of technical devices like radio and radar or by air 
reconnaissance, could arrive on the scene in very litde time. 
Part V 
Post-World War II (1948-to date) 
As the footnotes will have indicated, there has been much discussion of the 
question of restrictions on submarine warfare and the continued viability of the 
1936 London Submarine Protocol since the end of World War II and the 
completion of the trial before the International Military Tribunal. However, 
unfortunately, there has been no attempt on the part of the international 
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community to clarify a very confused situation, something that should be 
avoided at all costs in the law of war. The only "official" action which has been 
taken in this respect during the past forty or more years is the issuance by the 
U.S. Navy of its Commander's Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operations. That 
I . h fc 11 . 166 vo ume contams teo OWIng: 
Although the rules of the 1936 London Protocol continue to apply to surface 
warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including 
satellite communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems, 
as well as the customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following 
World War II. Accordingly, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and 
destroyed by surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of the 
following circumstances: 
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture; 
2. Refusing to stop upon being summoned to do so; 
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft; 
4. If armed; 167 
5. Ifincorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the 
enemy's armed forces; 
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed 
forces; 
7. If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and 
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the 
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent 
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 
In an earlier volume, entitled LAw of Naval Warfare, sub-paragraph 4, above, had 
included the additional words "and there is reason to believe that such armament 
has been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy.,,168 In 
explanation of the deletion of those words, a proposed Annotated Supplement 
to the Handbook, which is unofficial and which is still in draft form, states: 
In light of modem weapons it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible, 
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively against an 
enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able 
to make that determination. Accordingly, this rule has been modified in this text 
from that previously appearing in NWIP 10-2, para. 503b(3).4. 
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In the 1987 volume we find a number of references to submarines and to 
submarine warfare. Having stated that "[t]he law of armed conflict imposes 
essentially the same rules on submarines as apply to surface warships (a paraphrase 
of the first paragraph of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol), the Handbook 
goes on to say: 169 
8.3.1. Interdiction oJEnemy Merchant Shipping by Submarines. The conventional rules 
of naval warfare pertaining to submarine operations against enemy merchant 
shipping constitute one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict. 
Although the submarine's effectiveness as a weapons system is dependent upon its 
capability to remain submerged (and thereby undetected) and despite its 
vulnerability when surfaced, the London Protocol of 1936 makes no distinction 
between submarines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction of enemy 
merchant shipping. The London Protocol specifies that except in the case of 
persistent refusal to stop when ordered to do so, or in the event of active resistance 
to capture, a warship, "whether surface or submarine" may not destroy an enemy 
merchant vessel "without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers 
.in a place of safety." The impracticality of imposing upon submarines the same 
targeting constraints as burden surface warships is reflected in the practice of 
belligerents of both sides during World War II when submarines regularly attacked 
and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping. As in the case of such 
attacks by surface warships, this practice was justified either as a reprisal in response 
to unlawful acts of the enemy or as a necessary consequence of the arming of 
merchant vessels, of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant 
shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort. 
The United States considers that the London Protocol of 1936, coupled with 
the customary practice of belligerents during and following World War II, 
imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of 
passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of an enemy merchant 
vessel unless: 
1. The enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do so or 
otherwise resists capture. 
2. The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itself armed. 
3. The enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's military 
intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary to the enemy's 
armed forces. 
4. The enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its warfighting or 
war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the 
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circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger 
or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 
In a learned discussion of this problem which arrives at conclusions closely 
resembling those reached by the draftsmen of the Handbook, one author states:170 
Besides the two circumstances mentioned in Article 22 (2) of the London Naval 
Treaty of 193G-persistent refusal to stop on being summoned and active 
resistance to visit and search-there are other situations in which international law 
may allow the attack and destruction of merchant vessels. They include: 
i) sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft. 
ii) if armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used, 
or is intended for use offensively against an enemy. 
iii) if incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of an 
enemy's armed forces. 
iv) if acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed 
forces 
He immediately points out that "[m]any British writers question the validity of 
some of these situations." 
Conclusions 
Can it be said that, after the experiences of two World Wars, the mandates 
of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, codifYing customary international law, 
are still a valid and binding part of the law of war at sea? The International 
Military Tribunal, sitting after the conclusion of those two conflagrations, left 
no doubt that in its opinion the provisions of the Protocol had been, during 
World War II, and still were, after that conflict, very much alive and binding. 
A majori~ of the writers who have studied the problem are of a similar 
opinion.1 1 Although it is unquestionably true that a rule of international law 
may be changed by evidence of a substantial change in the practice of States, the 
failure of one belligerent in World War I to comply with the applicable rules 
of customary international law, following which it was severely chastised for its 
action and the rules were codified, and the failure of three belligerents in World 
War II (Germany, Japan, and the United States), even though they may have 
been major maritime Powers, to comply with the provisions of the Protocol 
does not forever erase them from the rule book. During World War I all of the 
Entente Powers and the United States, both as a neutral and as a Power associated 
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with the Entente Powers, insisted that the rules with respect to submarine 
warfare, which were then a part of customary international law and are now set 
forth in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, were valid and binding rules. 
During the interim between the wars a large number of the nations of the world, 
including in many cases those which later did not comply therewith, accepted 
these rules in conventional form in 1922, in 1930, in 1936, and in 1937. The 
failure of Germany, Japan, and the United States to comply with those rules 
during World War II did not result in their nullification. It must also be borne 
in mind that in both World Wars Germany contended that her failure to comply 
with the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare was an act of 
reprisal, i.e., an admittedly illegal act. The same argument may, perhaps, be made 
for the United States inasmuch as a Japanese submarine had already sunk. an 
American merchantman without warning when the message ordering 
unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States Navy, concerning which 
Admiral Nimitz testified, was sent.172 (No evidence could be found that Japan 
claimed that her unrestricted submarine warfare was an act of reprisal.) 173 
Which brings the present author to the following conclusions: 
1. While, during World War II, the provisions of the 1936 London 
Submarine Protocol were largely not applied, this was frequendy excused by 
the particular belligerent, not on the basis that they were no longer a part of the 
law of war at sea, but on the basis of reprisals against illegal actions on the part 
of the enemy (arming of merchant vessels with guns and depth charges, sailing 
them in warship-escorted convoys, ordering the immediate reporting by radio 
of submarine sightings, ordering merchant vessels to ram submarines, illegal 
mining, illegal expansion of the list of contraband, illegal blockades, declarations 
of war zones, etc.), in itself a recognition of the continuing validity of those 
provisions; 
2. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol continues to be a valid and 
subsisting part of the law of war at sea; 
3. If the establishment of zones (operations zones, war zones, exclusion zones, 
combat zones, etc.) is determined to be a legal method of making war at sea, 
the application of the rules of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol will be 
largely, but not entirely, nullified, at least in the zones so declared; 
4. It is highly probable that in any World War III belligerents will again find 
reasons why the 1936 London Submarine Protocol should not be applied; 
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5. In any future armed conflict oflesser extent than a World War III the 
pressure of neutral Powers may be sufficiently strong to cause the belligerents 
to comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol. 
One cannot do better than to conclude a study of the submarine with a portion 
of the final conclusion reached by a noted expert in a book recently published: 174 
The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must 
therefore be recognised as having begun .... Five hundred years ago, before the 
sailing-ship pioneers ventured into great waters, the oceans were an empty place, 
the only area of the world's surface in which men did not deploy military force 
against each other. In a future war the oceans might appear empty again, swept 
clear both of merchant traffic and of the navies which have sought so long to 
protect it against predators. Yet the oceans' emptiness will be illusory, for in their 
deeps new navies of submarine warships, great and small, will be exacting from 
each other the price of admiralty. 
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Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 139 (1971) where the following appears: 
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summarized in the Harvard Research at 679. In S.S. Hall, Submarine Waifare, 5 Trans. Grot. Soc. 82, 89 (1920), 
the author, a Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy, stated that merchantmen in convoys "appear to lose their 
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supra note 127, at 59. 
135. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note lOS, at 140. 
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had no protection (Article 32), that forcible resistance could be overcome by force (Article 36), and that the 
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D (1954). Fuehrer's Directive No.7, October 18, 1939, id. at 316, authorized the Navy to "attack enemy 
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night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order 
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13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 357. 
142. See supra notes 102 and 103. See also Doenitz's testimony before the International Military Tribunal, 
13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 253. 
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they continued to deny this and itwas not until after the war had ended that the truth was learned. 1 T.M.W.C., 
supra note 70, at 316; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note lOS, at 143. 
144. In 2 George Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
433 (1968), the following apt statement appears: 
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to the same effect. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 311-12; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note lOS, at 138-139. 
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protection and does not signifY a breach of neutrality" and the Germans disagreed. 8 Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 319-20, Series D (1954). 
149. U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
(NWP 9),1987, para. 8.2.2.2. [hereinafter Commander's Handbook]. 
150. Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and Peace of the United States etc., November 4, 1939, 
54 Stat. 4; 34 Am.J. Int'1. L. 44, 51 (Supp. 1940). 
151. Presidential Proclamation of November 4,1939, Use ifPorls or Territorial Waten if the United States 
by SllbmarillC$ if Foreigll Belligere/lt States, 54 Stat. 2672 (1939); 1 Dep't St. Bull. 456 (No. 19, November 4, 
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153. Presidential Proclamation of November 4, 1939, Difillition if Combat Areas, 54 Stat. 2673 (1939); 1 
Dep't St. Bull. 454-55 (No. 19, November 4, 1939); 1939 International Law Situations, supra note 151, at 
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154. 13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 365. One author goes even further, asserting that: "There is no 
logical difference between the merchant ship on the one hand and the railroad train or the factory on the 
other." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1108. 
155. 13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 367. Later answers indicated that he was referring to the provisions 
of Article 16 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles 
of the Geneva Convention, siglled at The Hague, October 18,1907,36 Stat. 2371; 2 Am.J. Int'1. 1. 153 
(Supp. 1908); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 313. 
156. 1 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 312-13; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note lOS, at 139. 
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note 41, at 80, where the author points out: 
There is no indication that the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the alternative interpretation 
that the Protocol was inapplicable in operational areas since there was no international agreement on 
this subject. Such an interpretation was advanced by Kranzbuhler [Doenitz's defense attorney] and it 
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operational area is evaluated as too important to be dealt with by implication. 
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158. Su, e.g., the testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner, 13 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 453. See also 
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161. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 4-12,1948, at 1072-73 
(mimeo, n.d.) (hereinafter Judgment); 1 The Tokyo Judgment 412 (B.V.A. Roling & C.F. Ruter eds., 1977) 
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rescue was deemed to run "counter to the rudimentary demands of war for the destruction of enemy 
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Tucker, supra note 148, at 73. 
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164. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 311-13; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 138-40. The Tribunal 
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Nazi Conspiracy 143. 
165. Frits Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 139-40. 
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international law. It is of interest to note that Russia never ratified the 1907 Hague Convention No. 
VII and that the Soviet Union is not a Party thereto. 
168. Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 166, at para. 503b(3). 
169. Commander's Handbook, supra note 149, at para. 8.3.1. 
170. Edwin I. Nwogugu, supra note 148, at 355-56. 
171. Of the publicists whose works have been reviewed who express an opinion on the subject, the 
following take the position that the 1936 London Submarine Protocol is still binding law: Eric Castren, The 
Present Law of War and Neutrality 289 (1954); C.John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 388 
(3d ed., 1954); Gerald 1.A.D. Draper, Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities-the Laws of War and TIleir 
Etiforcement, 18 Nav. War Coli. Rev. 22, 30 (November 1965), reprinted in 62 International Law Studies 247 
(Richard B. Lillich &John Norton Moore eds., 1980); William T. Mallison,Jr., supra note 41, at 118-1221; 
Edwin 1. Nwogugu, supra note 148, at 359-60; Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 37, at 52; Horace B. Robertson, 
Jr., Submarine Waifare, inJAGJ. 7 (November 1956); Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 198 
(3rd ed., 1959); and Robert W. Tucker, supra note 148, at 352. The United States Navy's position, as expressed 
in Commander's Handbook supra note 149, at para. 8.3.1, is to the same effect. See supra text accompanying 
note 169. The publicists taking the position that the 1936 London Submarine Protocol is no longer an effective 
part of the law of maritime warfare include Barnes, Submarine Waifare and International Law, 2 World Polity 
121, 187 (1960); Kerr, supra note 77, at 1110; William O. Miller, The Law of Naval Warfare, 24 Nav. War 
Coli. Rev. 35 (February 1972), reprinted in 61 International Law Studies 263 (RichardB. Lillich &JohnNorton 
Moore eds., 1980); W. Hays Parks, Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law oj War, 108 U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc. 
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172. Robert W. Tucker, supra note 148, at 66. In answer to interrogatories prepared by Doenitz's defense 
counsel, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stated that on that date he had received a message ordering 
unrestricted submarine warfare. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 108-11. This could, of course, also be 
attributed to the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
173. Japanese merchant ships acted very much the same as British merchant ships, being armed, reporting 
submarine sightings, attempting to ram, etc. William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 89-90. This would 
have justified unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific by the United States. However, it would not be a 
justification for such action from the very first day of the war. Another author justifies the action of the United 
States on the basis that the Japanese merchant marine was integrated into the Japanese Navy (armed, sent radio 
sightings, etc.), that there was no danger to neutrals (there were no neutral vessels in the Pacific), and that 
there were no neutrals in the declared operational zones. Horace B. Robertson,Jr., supra note 48, at 8. 
174. John Keegan, supra note 86, at 274-75. The final chapter of this book (266-75) contains a succinct 
discussion of the tremendous technical evolution which the submarine has undergone since the end of World 
War II. 
